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Abstract 
Humans have developed a critical alertness to the believability and 
reliability of communication: epistemic vigilance (Sperber et al. 
2010). It is responsible for trusting interlocutors and believing 
interpretations. But what is exactly its role in communication? This 
paper suggests that epistemic vigilance may trigger shifts from a 
default processing strategy driven by expectations of optimal 
relevance to more complex processing strategies. These would be 
enacted when hearers notice speakers’ linguistic mistakes, hearers 
realise that they have made interpretive mistakes or when hearers 
discover that speakers seek to mislead them to erroneous or 
unintended interpretations. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Relevance Theory (Sperber and Wilson 1986, 1995; Wilson and Sperber 
2002, 2004) puts forward a model of utterance interpretation in which the 
comprehension module performs several simultaneous tasks. Their result 
is an interpretation of the utterance, which, if considered to be optimally 
relevant, will be regarded as the speaker’s informative intention – i.e. the 
set of assumptions that she intends to make manifest or, in other terms, 
what she purports to communicate. But in order to think that a particular 
interpretation is what the speaker intends to communicate, hearers must 
believe speakers are willing to do so and trust them as both information 
givers and competent, skilful communicators who make use of the 
linguistic code in an efficient way. Also, hearers must trust and rely on 
their own interpretive abilities and capabilities, as they may make 
interpretive mistakes that might go unnoticed. 
When communicating we exchange information that may be true, 
false, incomplete, ambiguous, tricky, deceptive or presented to us not in 
the best linguistic form. Humans have developed complex cognitive 
mechanisms targeted at their sources of information and the content of 
information that they process. These check speakers’ competence and 
benevolence and the credibility of information. Mascaro and Sperber 
(2009) and Sperber et al. (2010) argue that such mechanisms make up a 
mental module, which they label epistemic vigilance. This module is, 
therefore, responsible for one of the perlocutionary effects of 
communication, namely, whether we end up believing our interlocutors 
and the information they provide us with (Sperber et al. 2010; Wilson 
2011, 2012a, 2012b). It checks both the quality of the information we 
receive and the individuals who dispense it. As a mental module, it has a 
very specific domain of operation and works in an incredibly fast and sub-
conscious way. However, if it contributes to the mentioned perlocutionary 
effect and hence plays a crucial role in communication, it might somehow 
be related to the comprehension module and affect its tasks. 
This paper suggests what that relation between epistemic vigilance and 
the comprehension module might be and the consequences of its working 
on the comprehension module. It argues that, as a verifier of the reliability 
and credibility of both communicators and information exchanged, 
epistemic vigilance checks, on the one hand, our interlocutors’ 
benevolence and linguistic or pragmatic competence, and, on the other 
hand, it monitors and surveys the different interpretive steps that we take 
as hearers, their potential or actual outcomes and the pragmatic material 
exploited in them in order to test their trustworthiness, usefulness and 
viability for the process of comprehension. If it discovers that something 
goes wrong or might go wrong, it is capable of instructing the 
comprehension module to adopt more complex and effort-demanding 
processing strategies than the strategy that it might make use of by default, 
driven by expectations and considerations of optimal relevance. More 
specifically, this paper proposes that epistemic vigilance is able to make 
the comprehension module shift from the strategy labelled naïve optimism 
to either cautious optimism or sophisticated understanding (Sperber 1994). 
Such shifts would be enacted if epistemic vigilance discovers that (i) our 
interlocutors are not (very) competent language users, (ii) we make 
interpretive mistakes at either the explicit or implicit level of 
communication, and (iii) our interlocutors either do not behave 
benevolently and intentionally try to deceive us by offering information 
that cannot or should not be believed or play with us by inducing us to 
arrive at an interpretation that could be initially accepted and believed, but 
must be subsequently rejected. In other words, epistemic vigilance might 
trigger the said processing strategies when it finds out that speakers make 
expressive mistakes, we make interpretive mistakes or speakers 
intentionally mislead us or playfully fool us for the sake of achieving 
effects like humour. 
This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 briefly summarises some 
of the relevance-theoretic postulates on and claims about utterance 
interpretation and introduces epistemic vigilance. Section 3 describes 
naïve optimism and argues that it may be the processing strategy that the 
comprehension module resorts to by default. Then, Section 4 shows that 
naïve optimism may be abandoned in favour of cautious optimism when 
epistemic vigilance notices that either the speaker may not have a proper 
command of language or that the comprehension module may be affected 
by temporary or permanent pragmatic deficits. Finally, Section 5 argues 
that the comprehension module may turn to sophisticated understanding 
when epistemic vigilance detects that the speaker is trying to fool and 
mislead the hearer to an interpretation that does not correspond to her 
actual informative intention. It illustrates this by discussing how epistemic 
vigilance would react to a playful, innocuous, amicable type of deception 
like jokes. 
 
 
2. Relevance and epistemic vigilance in comprehension 
 
Relevance Theory (Sperber and Wilson 1986, 1995; Wilson and Sperber 
2002, 2004) is grounded on two general principles based on a tendency of 
our cognitive mechanism, which seem to be the result of centuries of 
continuous evolution in order to achieve greater efficiency of resources. 
On the one hand, the Cognitive Principle of Relevance states that “Human 
cognition tends to be geared to the maximisation of relevance”. On the 
other hand, the Communicative Principle of Relevance claims that “Every 
act of ostensive communication communicates a presumption of its own 
optimal relevance” (Sperber and Wilson 1995: 260).  
Relevance theory seeks to solve the problem of why, out of the many 
possible interpretations that utterances and stretches of discourse may 
have, all of them compatible with the information linguistically encoded, 
hearers arrive at one interpretation. It argues that comprehension is 
relevance-driven and that hearers opt for one particular interpretation and 
believe it to be the speaker’s informative intention on the basis of the 
expectations of relevance that utterances generate. It defines relevance as a 
feature of ostensive stimuli like utterances which depends on two factors: 
a) The cognitive effort that the hearer will have to invest when 
processing an utterance. This depends on the psychological 
complexity of utterances or the mental effort required in selecting 
an appropriate context for interpretation. 
b) The cognitive effects that the processing of the utterance will 
yield. These are the benefits the utterance will provide the hearer 
with, i.e. strengthening of previous information, contradiction 
and rejection of old information, or the derivation of new 
information from the information the utterance makes manifest 
and the old information the hearer has stored –contextual 
implications. 
Expectations of relevance are constant throughout the comprehension 
process, which involve both decoding and inference. The former is 
performed by the language module of the brain and its output is a logical 
form, or structured sequence of concepts parsed and grouped into 
sentential constituents (Sperber and Wilson 1995: 74). But the logical 
form of an utterance is not fully propositional and hence communicatively 
useless unless it is pragmatically enriched with contextual information. 
Such process involves the assignment of reference to certain expressions, 
the disambiguation of syntactic material, the narrowing or broadening of 
concepts up to a point in which ad-hoc, occasion-specific concepts are 
built, and free enrichment of non-coded concepts (Carston 2002, 2010). 
The result of these tasks is a fully-fledged propositional form, or the 
basic explicature of the utterance. This may be further inserted into a 
speech-act or propositional-attitude description. If this basic explicature is 
a lower-level explicature of an utterance, such a description is its higher-
level explicature. The explicature of an utterance may be what the speaker 
intends to communicate in an explicit way. However, if the hearer has 
evidence to believe or senses that the speaker might intend to 
communicate some message implicitly, his expectations of relevance will 
prompt him to use the explicature as further input for inferential processes 
with a view to arriving at that implicit content. Then, the hearer will relate 
it to any other contextual assumptions manifest to him which he feels the 
speaker intended him to use –implicated premises– in order to reach the 
implicated conclusion that she wanted to communicate. Those 
assumptions make up the context for interpretation and are stored in an 
organised way. Some of them are cultural information or cultural 
metarepresentations (Sperber 1996), while others are grouped in different 
types of make-sense frames (Yus Ramos, forthcoming a), schemata or 
scripts in order to capture different aspects of reality, experience, relations 
etc1.  
All these interpretive processes are not sequential, but happen 
simultaneously. When carrying them out, hearers normally follow the path 
requiring the least cognitive effort possible and yielding the highest 
amount of cognitive benefit. This tendency is known as the relevance-
theoretic comprehension procedure, and entitles hearers to allocate the 
minimum processing effort possible when constructing interpretive 
hypotheses about both the explicit and implicit content of utterances and to 
stop processing when their expectations of relevance are satisfied, i.e. 
when they feel that they have obtained some worthy cognitive gain. If the 
interpretation at which they stop is the least effort-requiring and the most 
effect-yielding one, that interpretation will be optimally relevant. Since 
comprehension is relevance-driven, once the comprehension module finds 
an optimally relevant interpretation, the hearer may conclude that such 
interpretation corresponds to what the speaker intended to communicate. 
However, for the hearer to conclude and believe that an optimally 
relevant interpretation may in fact be what the speaker intended to 
communicate and expected him to arrive at, the hearer must trust his 
information sources, i.e. both his interlocutor and the different contextual 
sources he accesses –cultural metarepresentations, make-sense frames, the 
physical environment, etc. (Yus Ramos 2000)– and rely on the interpretive 
procedures conducive to that interpretation. Although the hearer arrives at 
a particular interpretation and finds it optimally relevant, he might realise 
that such interpretation was unintended because the speaker made some 
expressive mistake –a slip of the tongue, a pragmalinguistic or a 
sociopragmatic failure (Thomas 1983)– owing to some temporary or 
constant pragmatic deficit. Alternatively, the hearer may be uncertain 
about the plausibility of a particular interpretation because he might have 
made a mistake at any of those steps and consequently feel that, to a 
greater or lesser extent, he has misunderstood his interlocutor. Therefore, 
he must make sure that the different interpretive steps he takes and their 
outcomes are fool-proof. 
Our cognitive mechanism seems to have developed a certain capacity 
to check whether we can trust and rely on our interlocutors, different 
information sources and mental procedures. Also the result of evolution 
                                                          
1
 Yus Ramos (forthcoming a) coins the term make-sense frame in order to 
overcome the existing overlapping between terms like ‘frame’, ‘schema’ and 
‘script’. Make-sense frames consist of encyclopaedic information related to 
specific terms (word-associated schemas), actions (sequence-associated scripts) 
and situations (situation-associated frames). 
and the constant search for maximum efficiency, this capacity is epistemic 
vigilance (Mascaro and Sperber 2009; Sperber et al. 2010). It consists of a 
captious alertness to the believability and reliability of communication and 
the individuals involved in it, which incites hearers to adopt a critical 
stance towards messages, their senders and how they interpret messages 
(Sperber et al. 2010: 363). As a mental module, it targets and operates on 
the domain of the information exchanged in communication, the 
information used in comprehension and the mental operations performed 
when processing it. Epistemic vigilance does not oppose to trusting, 
neither is it some kind of default distrust; it is opposed to blind and naïve 
trust (Sperber et al. 2010). Therefore, it induces individuals to adopt some 
form of caption towards others, messages, our own abilities and 
preferences as interpreters and the interpretations we may reach (Padilla 
Cruz, in press). 
Since epistemic vigilance checks the credibility of information and our 
interlocutors’ honesty, it plays a major role in argumentation by testing the 
internal consistency of assertions and their logical or evidential relations to 
the contextual information employed to support or disconfirm them 
(Oswald 2011). Epistemic vigilance mechanisms are also linked to the 
modality and evidentiality markers that some languages have developed, 
which activate mental procedures geared to assessing the reliability, 
honesty and trustworthiness of our communicators and the information 
that they provide (Unger 2012; Wilson 2012b). As a consequence of its 
operation, epistemic vigilance may also be crucial in the avoidance of the 
epistemic injustices that may arise as a result of our interlocutors’ 
perceived temporary or recurrent pragmatic incompetence (Padilla Cruz, 
forthcoming). If epistemic vigilance evaluates the reliability of 
information, it may also be postulated to act like some kind of ever-
working filter or fault-finding checker of interpretations of any 
information at every step of comprehension: hypotheses about 
explicatures, implicated premises needed and implicated conclusions 
expected or intended. If an interpretation passes through the filters of 
epistemic vigilance and is found to be believable, reasonable and fault-
free, the hearer may take it to be the speaker’s informative intention, but, 
more importantly, he may add up the information that it makes manifest to 
his personal universe of beliefs (Wilson 2011, 2012a, 2012b). 
But what happens if an interpretation does not pass the filters of 
epistemic vigilance? In other words, what if epistemic vigilance does not 
find the speaker to be (fully) competent or trustworthy, or, alternatively, if 
it detects that something could have gone wrong when processing 
discourse? This is what the following sections discuss. 
 3. Naïve optimism 
 
In ideal circumstances, when interpreting utterances hearers follow the 
least effort-demanding and most effect-yielding interpretive path. When 
they arrive at an interpretation that appears optimally relevant, they stop 
processing and take it to be their interlocutor’s informative intention. 
Accordingly, the comprehension module could be thought to activate 
some kind of default processing strategy which would be the easiest, 
simplest and most straightforward available. Sperber (1994) terms this 
strategy naïve optimism. When individuals resort to it, they behave as 
naïvely optimistic hearers.  
A naïvely optimistic hearer presupposes two fundamental things about 
his interlocutor: 
(i) The speaker is benevolent, i.e. trustworthy, and therefore will not 
seek to deceive him by providing him with false, unreliable or 
incomplete information. 
(ii) The speaker is competent, i.e. she has an adequate command of 
the grammatical rules and the norms of usage of the language 
with which she communicates, and will attempt to provide 
information that turns out optimally relevant 
Consequently, a naïvely optimistic hearer will follow the relevance-
theoretic comprehension procedure and will metarepresent his 
interlocutor’s informative intention because he takes for granted the 
following: 
a) The speaker knows the abstract system and the different 
conventions of meaning and use of the vehicle for 
communication that she uses. 
b) The speaker will try to make manifest her informative intention in 
the most straightforward way, avoiding ambiguities, vagueness or 
inaccuracies liable to result in misunderstandings. 
c) The speaker, in doing so, will guide the hearer to the intended 
interpretation in the most efficient way, i.e. the least effort-
consuming and most effect-yielding way. 
If the speaker is indeed competent and benevolent and does not want to 
appear otherwise, she will check the following: 
a) That the information that she intends to communicate will in fact 
become optimally relevant to the hearer by producing a 
satisfactory amount of cognitive effects in exchange of a 
reasonable amount of cognitive effort. 
b) That the communicative strategy with which she conveys her 
message is appropriate, i.e. that its pragmalinguistic structure, 
lexical constituents, syntactic organization and any paralinguistic 
device he resorts to are not misleading. 
c) That the hearer will quickly and easily recover the intended 
interpretation instead of unintended ones which may appear 
relevant enough. 
If all this applies, the chances for communication to succeed and for 
the hearer to arrive at the intended interpretation are very high. However, 
and quite regrettably, communication faces plenty of risks and challenges 
conducive to failure. When processing utterances at the explicit level, the 
comprehension module might make mistakes by assigning the wrong 
reference to referential elements, not disambiguating syntactic structures 
correctly or not making the appropriate conceptual adjustment, for 
instance. Likewise, at the implicit level of communication the 
comprehension module might relate utterances to unintended or 
inappropriate cultural metarepresentations or manifest contextual 
assumptions, find it hard to access implicated premises crucial for the 
derivation of implicatures, or activate inaccurate or inappropriate frames.  
On the other hand, the speaker, even if benevolent and trying to appear 
competent, may not behave in a fully competent manner. She may 
inadvertently make mistakes when formulating her utterances by using 
wrong referential elements, inadequate lexical items, inappropriate 
intonation or selecting inadequate pragmalinguistic strategies. These may 
misguide the hearer when interpreting the explicit content of utterances. 
Also, speakers may expect hearers to be able to recover some implicit 
content on the basis of specific cultural metarepresentations, make-sense 
frames or manifest assumptions, but they may be unaware that those are 
unavailable or easily accessible to them, or that their contents vary to a 
greater or lesser extent. If this happens, hearers may reach unintended 
interpretations. 
If epistemic vigilance acts as a monitor of the interpretive routes 
hearers opt for, and as a verifier of the credibility and reliability of 
information sources and the content of the information the comprehension 
module works with, it might detect that the interpretive hypotheses about 
both the explicit and implicit content of utterances constructed may be 
erroneous, inaccurate or inappropriate and, therefore, may prevent the 
hearer from correctly inferring the speaker’s informative intention. 
Consequently, if it notices that an interpretation reached or reachable when 
following naïve optimism might not be the intended one, epistemic 
vigilance might trigger a shift of processing strategy. The following 
sections argue that epistemic vigilance might cause the comprehension 
module to turn to two more sophisticated processing strategies: cautious 
optimism or sophisticated understanding (Sperber 1994). 
 
 
4. Epistemic vigilance and cautious optimism 
 
Speakers may inadvertently make mistakes when formulating their 
messages, which might lead hearers to misunderstand them. Needless to 
say, hearers may also make interpretive mistakes. If such mistakes went 
unnoticed, a naïvely optimistic hearer might end up arriving at an 
interpretation, though seeming relevant enough, is unintended. However, 
epistemic vigilance could detect those mistakes and prompt a shift to 
cautious optimism (Sperber 1994). 
Cautious optimism entitles a hearer to assume that, even though his 
interlocutor is benevolent and does not seem to be deceptive, her level of 
competence might be less than appropriate. Consequently, a cautiously 
optimistic hearer can realise that an interpretation reached on the grounds 
of a particular linguistic formulation appearing relevant enough might not 
be the actually intended one. As a consequence of her cognitive abilities 
and expressive preferences, the speaker may make slips of the tongue or 
unfortunate stylistic choices that do not guide the hearer to the most easily 
accessible and least effort-demanding interpretation. On the contrary, these 
result in undesired interpretations accidentally achieving relevance or 
desired interpretations accidentally not achieving relevance (Wilson 1999). 
To overcome these problems, cautious optimism encourages the hearer to 
engage in further inferential processes that lead him to abandon an 
infelicitous interpretation that accidentally appears relevant or irrelevant, 
and to attribute to his interlocutor the intention to communicate another 
interpretation that he cannot arrive at because of the speaker’s momentary 
or constant incompetence. But that shift to cautious optimism would not 
take place unless epistemic vigilance alerts the comprehension module to 
some inconsistency or flaw in the linguistic formulation or to foreseeable 
undesired consequences. 
On many occasions, speakers select linguistic material that misleads 
hearers when constructing the explicature of an utterance. For instance, 
they select wrong lexical items to allude to some entities (1), inappropriate 
gendered forms of personal pronouns to refer back to a particular 
individual (2) or deictics which fail to correctly locate an object in space 
(3): 
 
(1) Yes, they are building a new sky-scratcher in the city! 
(2) And Tom arrived and saw Mary and he said […] and she [Tom] was 
very happy to meet her [Mary]. 
(3) Give me this knife, please! 
 
Epistemic vigilance would warn the comprehension module that the 
speaker might have unknowingly made a mistake because the resulting 
interpretation would be at odds with contextual assumptions already 
manifest, fail to make sense or simply not achieve an optimal level of 
relevance. Consequently, epistemic vigilance would set cautious optimism 
in motion, which would encourage the comprehension module to wonder 
which other lexical item, pro-form or deictic the speaker should have 
employed, or, alternatively, which referents the speaker would have 
meant, for the envisaged interpretation to be really optimally relevant. 
Epistemic vigilance might also trigger cautious optimism when 
speakers mispronounce words or have very strong or unfamiliar accents. 
Mispronunciation or strong accents may make the comprehension module 
regard what seems to be a hard-to-understand utterance as irrelevant owing 
to additional load of cognitive effort and prevent it from understanding it. 
Thanks to cautious optimism, however, the comprehension module would 
look for alternatives to incomprehensible words or stretches and strive to 
make sense out of them. For instance, epistemic vigilance seemed not to 
be fully operative when a Briton congratulated a Canadian father who was 
explaining that his son was ‘autistic’. Not fully understanding the 
Canadian father’s pronunciation, the Brit took the Canadian’s 
pronunciation of the word ‘autistic’ to mean ‘artistic’ –which did not at all 
make sense in that context, though– hence the misunderstanding. 
Likewise, epistemic vigilance seemed not to work properly when a British 
Railway waiter gave ‘a Hague’ (whisky) to an American Southerner who 
had intended to order ‘an egg’ for breakfast but pronunced [ǫǺg] (Wells 
1996). 
On other occasions, speakers select wrong intonation contours which 
induce hearers to embed lower-level explicatures under incorrect higher-
level explicatures, as intonation has a procedural meaning that guides the 
construction of the latter (Wharton 2009). This results in puzzled 
understanding (Yus Ramos 1999), a misunderstanding which Tannen 
(1984) observed, for instance, at a canteen where a foreign waiter used a 
falling intonation instead of a rising one when offering customers gravy. 
Customers perceived her offer as impolitely imposing. To avoid the 
misunderstanding, epistemic vigilance should have alerted the customers’ 
comprehension module to the infelicitous intonation and triggered 
cautious optimism. As a result, customers would have discarded the 
undesired order-interpretation and attributed to the waiter the intention to 
make an offer, though in a somewhat strange manner. 
Quite similarly, many non-native speakers transfer inadequate 
pragmalinguistic strategies from their L1 to make their informative 
intention manifest. Since these have a specific meaning or value in the L1, 
they may cause a native hearer turn an intended explicature into an 
unintended implicature (Yus Ramos 1999). This is what may happen to 
waiters when dealing with Spaniards learning English, who directly 
translate the alerter and head act frequently employed in Spanish to make 
an order (4) into English (5). Instead of recovering the request- or order-
interpretation, waiters may interpret this sequence as over-imposing, 
threatening or defiant: 
 
(4) ¡Oiga! Póngame un café 
(5) Listen! Put me one coffee / Give me one coffee! 
 
In a case like this, having checked speakers’ benevolence, epistemic 
vigilance would alert the comprehension module to the unfortunate 
selection of this pragmalinguistic strategy and trigger cautious optimism. 
Cautious optimism would lead hearers to discard unwanted implicatures of 
impoliteness or undue imposition and to conclude that the learners’ 
intention was only to order something in a somewhat awkward way 
because of their low level of competence in the L2. 
Although many times individuals’ competence as speakers is at stake, 
other times it is their competence as hearers. Just in the same way 
speakers’ stylistic choices may be unfortunate because of momentary 
mental limitations or lack of mastery of the linguistic system, hearers may 
also experience constant or temporary problems when processing 
utterances. These may result in their reaching unintended interpretations, 
which they might unfortunately consider to match their interlocutors’ 
informative intention, as such interpretations accidentally seem relevant 
enough. As a critical alertness to the reliability of communication, 
epistemic vigilance would monitor comprehension by keeping track of the 
choices the language and comprehension modules make and the contextual 
material the latter resorts to. It would assess the accuracy of the 
interpretive tasks performed, the believability and suitability of the 
information employed, the reliability of the interpretive routes taken and 
the potential plausibility, correctness and relevance of the interpretation 
selected. Thus, epistemic vigilance might spot flaws and trigger cautious 
optimism, if it detects that those modules perform inefficiently or 
ultimately feels that the hearer’s competence is momentarily impaired. 
At the explicit level of communication, epistemic vigilance can notice 
that an explicature might be unintended because of errors in reference 
assignment (6), disambiguation (7, 8) or conceptual adjustment (9). As a 
result, epistemic vigilance would enact cautious optimism so that the 
comprehension module searches for alternative referents, parses 
ambiguous syntax differently or narrows or broadens concepts as 
expected: 
 
(6) Leave it there! (there = on the table? on the shelf?) 
 
(7) John saw the man with the red glasses. (John saw [the man with the 
red glasses]]/[John saw [the man] [with the red glasses]]?) 
(8) They are hunting dogs. ([They are hunting [dogs]]/[They are [hunting 
dogs]]?) 
(9) Martha cut the tree. (Martha *CUT the tree [an ad-hoc concept 
referring to a particular type of cutting –with a saw instead of with 
scissors, for instance]) 
 
Epistemic vigilance can also detect that a belief the hearer holds (10) 
may induce him to build an erroneous higher-level explicature and 
misinterpret the illocutionary force of an utterance –for instance, as a 
criticism or sarcasm instead of as praise or compliment (11):  
 
(10) Peter disapproves of women wearing mini-skirts to attend religious 
services. 
(11) Oh, cute skirt! ([Context: right before a religious service] irony, 
sarcasm, implicit criticism, complaint…?) 
 
Upon detecting that the interpretation reachable on the grounds of that 
belief might conflict with, for example, manifest contextual elements like 
paralanguage (gestures, face-expression, etc.), epistemic vigilance would 
instruct the comprehension module to enact cautious optimism in order to 
revise the belief entertained and, if necessary, entertain another which 
makes it possible to arrive at another interpretation that achieves an 
optimal level of relevance and turns out to be more consistent with what is 
perceived. 
At the implicit level of communication, epistemic vigilance can also 
alert the comprehension module that an implicature (14) might be 
unintended because the comprehension module unnecessarily took the 
explicature of an utterance (12) as input to further inferential processes, in 
which it was related to unwarranted implicated premises (13):  
 
[Context: two friends strolling aimlessly down the street, without a clear 
direction] 
(12) It is 20.20! (intended as a phatic remark) 
(13) a. Shops close at 20.30. 
b. Speaker might want to buy something 
(14) We should hurry up! 
 
Cautious optimism being triggered, the comprehension module would 
discard such implicated premises and backtrack to the explicit 
interpretation of the utterance. 
Quite similarly, epistemic vigilance can also find an initial explicit 
interpretation (16) of an utterance (15) not to be optimally relevant and 
feel that the speaker might have intended to convey some implicit content. 
Since the comprehension module has initially failed to arrive at it, cautious 
optimism aids in helping the hearer search for the necessary implicated 
premises (17) that yield such implicit content (18): 
 
[Context: Mary’s birthday is approaching. Mary and Peter are window-
shopping] 
(15) Mary: Isn’t that mobile cute? I love it! It must be fab! 
(16) Mary loves that mobile. 
(17) a. Mary’s birthday is approaching. 
b. Mary loves technology gadgets. 
c. A mobile is an excellent birthday present. 
(18) Mary might be suggesting that he would love a new mobile as a 
birthday present. 
 
Finally, epistemic vigilance could also sense that an implicature that 
the comprehension module arrives at differs from what the speaker could 
have wanted to convey –i.e. is an alternative implicature (Yus Ramos 
1999)– because the comprehension module has relied on cultural or 
contextual assumptions different from those that the speaker might have 
expected the hearer to resort to. Cross-cultural encounters attest this type 
of misunderstanding. For instance, Reynolds (1995) reports that Finnish 
students were surprised and even bothered by their British mates’ small 
talk in some situations. Having perceived their benevolence, epistemic 
vigilance should have triggered cautious optimism so that the Finnish 
students would have discarded cultural assumptions referring to the 
inconvenience of small talk in those situations and have processed it 
against other assumptions. This would have led them to a more plausible, 
optimally relevant interpretation of that conversational behaviour. 
 
5. Epistemic vigilance and sophisticated understanding 
 
Communication is an ostensive-inferential activity in which the speaker 
draws the hearer’s attention because she has an informative intention 
(Sperber and Wilson 1986, 1995). The hearer must infer that intention 
from utterances, which are indirect, more or less reliable, evidence of what 
the speaker intends to communicate. However, on many occasions, and for 
many reasons, an utterance is unreliable because the speaker does not 
actually have the informative intention that she appears to have, but some 
hidden intention. Thus, instead of behaving benevolently and sincerely, 
and so choosing the ostensive stimulus that most directly guides the hearer 
to her informative intention with the least effort, the speaker may behave 
malevolently or deceptively and select stimuli that make the hearer 
attribute to her an informative intention that differs from her actual one. 
Communication also presupposes a communicative intention that 
triggers the hearer’s search for the speaker’s informative intention. When 
hearers take for granted that speakers are benevolent and competent, they 
may think that an interpretation that they reach and find optimally relevant 
corresponds to the speakers’ informative intention. Therefore, hearers need 
not worry about the existence of alternative interpretations, which speakers 
might have purported to communicate. If hearers assume that speakers, 
though benevolent, are not (fully) competent, they ought to conclude that 
the speakers’ intention may be to communicate another interpretation and 
not one that only seems relevant and does not correspond to their real 
informative intention. If hearers feel that their own interpretive skills are 
impaired, they must deduce that they might not have reached the intended, 
optimally relevant interpretation. In these two scenarios, epistemic 
vigilance would alert to speakers’ or hearers’ incompetence and trigger 
cautious optimism, as a consequence of which the comprehension module 
would continue processing and search for more plausible interpretations. 
Cautious optimism triggered, hearers can question the outcomes of 
interpretive tasks, distrust some beliefs they could have held and wonder 
which other informative intention their interlocutors might have but fail to 
make manifest in the most efficient way or they themselves fail to infer. 
Consequently, hearers can attribute different beliefs and intentions to their 
interlocutors, who failed to be optimally relevant even though they 
attempted to be, or which they unfortunately were unable to perceive.  
Finally, when epistemic vigilance cautions the comprehension module 
that the speaker is competent but is not behaving benevolently, it would 
enact an even more complex processing strategy: sophisticated 
understanding (Sperber 1994). When following this strategy, a hearer is 
capable of inferring another interpretation that would indeed have been 
optimally relevant but which, for whatever reason, the speaker refrains 
from transmitting or prevents the hearer from reaching in the easiest way. 
As Wilson (1999: 138) explains, a sophisticated hearer uses his 
metarepresentational abilities in order to face utterances wherewith his 
interlocutor only tries to communicate an interpretation that seems to be 
relevant but is not the actually intended one. Consequently, a sophisticated 
hearer does not stop his processing at the first interpretation that he finds 
optimally relevant, or at the interpretation that he considers the speaker 
might have expected to appear optimally relevant.  
Epistemic vigilance could detect (i) that the speaker attempts to bias 
the hearer to some parsing, disambiguation, reference assignment or 
conceptual adjustment that would prevent him from reaching a certain 
envisaged interpretation which would have achieved optimal relevance, 
(ii) that the speaker guides the hearer to use implicated premises or to 
activate mental frames unsuitable for reaching a real interpretation, or (iii) 
that the comprehension module needs other contextual information in 
order to infer that interpretation. Therefore, it would trigger sophisticated 
understanding so that the comprehension module revises or continues its 
interpretive task until it deduces the interpretation which the speaker 
avoids communicating in the most direct and effort-saving way. Epistemic 
vigilance would be able to realise the existence of alternative parsings, 
disambiguation, reference assignment, conceptual adjustment, implicated 
premises or mental frames conducive to the interpretation that the speaker 
attempts to prevent the hearer from reaching. Thus, it would prompt the 
comprehension module not to regard a first interpretation appearing 
optimally relevant as the speaker’s informative intention, but as incorrect 
and misleading. On the contrary, upon detecting the feasibility of other 
interpretive routes and outcomes of interpretive tasks, epistemic vigilance 
would instruct the comprehension module to search for another 
interpretation which the speaker, for some reason, refrains from 
communicating. To do so, the comprehension module would follow the 
path it senses will require the least effort and will yield the highest amount 
of cognitive benefits. 
Epistemic vigilance appears essential in exchanges in which speakers 
intentionally seek or seem to deceive hearers, i.e. in cases in which hearers 
are led to entertain, and ultimately believe, an interpretation that does not 
correspond to the speaker’s real informative intention. Indeed, the speaker 
does her best to mislead the hearer by making an unintended interpretation 
appear very easily accessible, costless, plausible and, therefore, optimally 
relevant. However, that interpretation is not the one that the hearer should 
infer. In addition to lies, this happens, for instance, in some types of 
humour, like jokes. 
When telling jokes, speakers move to a non-bona-fide mode of 
communication (Raskin 1985; Attardo 1990, 1993) or to a humorous 
frame (Yamaguchi 1988), sometimes explicitly indicated by linguistic 
markers. They play with language, hearers’ interpretive capabilities and 
the likelihood that some interpretations become more or less salient in 
order to deceive hearers (Yus Ramos 2008: 133). Jokers do not deceive 
their audience by lying, but by fooling them or pulling their leg2. Jokers 
intentionally mislead hearers to some interpretation, try to make them 
reach it, consider it optimally relevant and ultimately believe it to be the 
intended one. But hearers must realise that they are being or have been 
misguided, backtrack and reinterpret the text (McGhee 1972; Attardo 
1993: 551). Thus, they can discard a (literal) bona-fide interpretation, 
which they probably infer following naïve optimism3. As Attardo (1993: 
550) puts it, the joker tries to “[…] actually ‘fool’ his/her [audience] into 
believing that ‘normal’ bona-fide text will follow, only to deceive his/her 
audience, and deliver instead the unexpected punch line”4.  
Reaching the authentic interpretation requires in many cases more 
effort-demanding interpretive routes, which the joker favours, maybe with 
the tacit promise of an increase in humorous effects which could not be 
achieved otherwise (Yus Ramos 2003: 1298-1299). Jokers can 
intentionally mislead or fool the audience, firstly, because they exploit the 
pragmatic ambivalence of utterances, which may potentially have a variety 
of interpretations, all of which compatible with the information 
linguistically encoded. Jokers are aware that the hearers’ comprehension 
module will not access or juggle with all of them at the same time, as 
some may be more salient and difficult to put down in a particular context 
(Peleg et al. 2008), while others look costlier. The hearer will select one 
interpretation and exclude competing ones on the basis of considerations 
                                                          
2
 This seems crucial for jokes to fulfil some social functions like decommitment 
and group identification (Attardo 1993: 554-556). However, this does not operate 
in subversive humour, where humourists make fun of established norms, rules, 
practices, etc. in some contexts, like the workplace (Schnurr and Rowe 2008) or 
schools (Norrick and Klein 2008). 
3
 Raskin (1985), Attardo (1990, 1993) and Raskin and Attardo (1994) have 
accounted for the interpretation of jokes on the basis of the Gricean Cooperative 
Principle and its maxims. Since Relevance Theory goes well beyond them and 
rejects their existence, no further explanation of jokes along them will be done. 
4
 For a slightly different proposal, see Dynel (2008: 174-176). 
of cognitive effort and reward (Wilson 1993; Wilson and Sperber 2002, 
2004).  
Secondly, jokers can mislead hearers because, so to say, they can read 
hearers’ minds. Jokers can predict to some extent which cognitive 
operations their comprehension module might perform, which contextual 
information it will access, which inferential routes it might follow and 
potential outcomes of those operations (Wilson and Sperber 2002, 2004). 
Hence, jokers rely on their mind-reading ability and “[…] predict that 
certain stimuli will be more relevant than others and that certain 
assumptions will inevitably be entertained by their audience during 
comprehension” (Yus Ramos 2008: 140). Accordingly, in many cases 
jokers devise jokes in such a way that the audience uses initial and next 
fragments as an interpretive context against which to process subsequent 
information (Yus Ramos 2008: 140). They manipulate this context so that 
the audience is made believe that the joke –or some fragment(s)– has a 
first –or several– highly salient and easily accessible, but wrong, 
interpretation(s) –the multiple-graded-interpretation (MGI) part of the 
joke, as Yus Ramos (2003: 1309) labels it. Nevertheless, the following 
fragment has a single interpretation which surprises or shocks the audience 
–the single-covert-interpretation (SCI) part of the joke (Yus Ramos 2003: 
1309)– because of its incongruity with the initial or preceding fragment. 
The hearer is surreptitiously led to entertain an incorrect interpretation in 
the MGI part of the joke, so what triggers humour is “The resolution of the 
incongruity, by finding one overall coherent sense of the whole text, 
together with the realization of having been fooled into selecting specific 
interpretation […]” (Yus Ramos 2003: 1309)5. The resolution of the 
incongruity depends on some kind of cognitive rule which reconciles the 
incongruous part of the joke (Suls 1972). Such rule can be “[…] semantic, 
logical, or experiential […]” and “[…] is identified through a problem 
solving activity” (Forabosco 2008: 47). It involves “[…] an element of 
sense, a criterion which renders the stimulus cognitively acceptable” 
(Forabosco 2008: 49)6. Upon realising that the comprehension module has 
been or is being fooled, epistemic vigilance would contribute to the 
resolution of incongruities by enacting sophisticated understanding and 
discovering such a rule or criterion. 
                                                          
5
 Yus Ramos’ (2003) account of jokes is in line with Suls’ (1972) incongruity-
resolution model and other related proposals (e.g. Forabosco 1992; Attardo 1994, 
1997). For criticism, see Forabosco (2008: 55-57). 
6
 Suls (1983) concluded that, while some types humour may rely on the perception 
and resolution of incongruities, other types may only rely on their perception. 
Since jokers can predict how hearers might process jokes and are 
aware of possible ambiguities of linguistic structures, salient information, 
etc., they try to create humour by manipulating hearers’ interpretive steps 
at both the explicit and implicit level of communication (Yus Ramos 
2008). As regards the explicit level of communication, jokers try to fool 
their audience at the different stages of comprehension, from the 
identification of the logical form, to reference assignment, disambiguation, 
conceptual adjustment or the construction of higher-level explicatures. 
Consider firstly the identification of logical forms. Many humourists bias 
their audience to a specific ascription of meaning or to an initial syntactic 
parsing, which must be subsequently invalidated to achieve humorous 
effects (Yus Ramos 2008: 145-146). This can be seen in jokes (19) and 
(20): 
 
(19) Why did the blonde take a ladder into the bar? She heard the drinks 
were on the house. 
(20) The blonde walks into a drugstore and asks the pharmacist for some 
bottom deodorant. The pharmacist, a little bemused, explains to the 
woman that they don’t sell anything called ‘bottom deodorant’, and 
never have. Unfazed, the blonde assures him that she has been buying 
the stuff from this store on a regular basis, and would like some more. 
“I’m sorry,” says the pharmacist, “we don’t have any.” “But I always 
get it here,” says the blonde. “Do you have the container it comes in?” 
“Yes!”, says the blonde, “I will go and get it.” She returns with the 
container and hands it to the pharmacist, who looks at it and says to 
her, “This is just a normal stick of underarm deodorant.” The annoyed 
blonde snatches the container back and reads out loud from the 
container: “To apply, push up bottom.” 
 
In (19) the joker makes the audience firstly regard as optimally 
relevant the likely, very salient, but eventually incorrect, interpretation 
“the house will pay for the drinks”. However, the correct interpretation is 
“drinks are located on top of the house”. Epistemic vigilance must detect 
that such initial ascription of meaning to the phrase “drinks were on the 
house” is unviable and make the language module backtrack so as to 
realise that a different, locative meaning for the expression “were on the 
house”, which did not initially achieve optimal relevance, can be more 
viable. Although this backtracking involves some cognitive effort, this is 
offset by additional cognitive effects, such as realisation of having been 
fooled, which would be responsible for potential humorous effects in that 
somewhat strange context of a blonde going to a bar with her ladder. In 
(20), apart from the ambiguity of the word ‘bottom’, the joker plays with 
two possible ways of parsing the string “push up bottom” –[push up] 
[bottom] vs. [push] [up bottom]– making the former very salient in that 
scenario. However, for humour to arise, epistemic vigilance should alert 
the comprehension module that such parsing, even if grammatically 
expectable, is inadequate. This would activate sophisticated 
understanding, which would result in the comprehension module 
considering the other parsing as necessary to grasp the humour in this 
situation. 
Jokers also exploit the way they think the audience will assign 
reference to some pro-forms (Yus Ramos 2008: 146), as in (21) and (22): 
 
(21) Said the Buddhist to the hotdog vendor: “Make me one with 
everything.” 
(22) A husband and wife came for counselling after 20 years of marriage. 
When asked what the problem was, the wife went into a passionate, 
painful tirade listing every problem they had ever had in the 20 years 
they had been married. She went on and on and on: neglect, lack of 
intimacy, emptiness, loneliness, feeling unloved and unlovable, an 
entire laundry list of unmet needs she had endured over the course of 
their marriage. Finally, after allowing this to go on for a sufficient 
length of time, the therapist got up, walked around the desk and, after 
asking the wife to stand, embraced and kissed her passionately as her 
husband watched with a raised eyebrow. The woman shut up and 
quietly sat down as though in a daze. The therapist turned to the 
husband and said, “This is what your wife needs at least three times a 
week. Can you do this?” The husband thought for a moment and 
replied, “Well, I can drop her off here on Mondays and Wednesdays, 
but on Fridays, I fish.” 
 
In (21) the joker makes the Buddhist echo Dalai Lama’s famous motto, but 
with evidently different meaning and overtones. For humour to arise, 
epistemic vigilance must alert the comprehension module to the different 
referential candidates for ‘one’ (‘hotdog’ vs. ‘oneself’) and ‘everything’ 
(“all the toppings, ingredients” vs. “the universe”). Probably, the easiest 
way of assigning reference to the Buddhist’s words is “make me one 
hotdog with all the toppings”, but humour might reside in the absurd 
possibility that the Buddhist is asking the vendor to enlighten him by 
“making him one being with all the toppings that the vendor has in his 
stall”. Having noticed the unsuitability of such reference assignment for 
the achievement of humour, epistemic vigilance would instruct the 
comprehension module to activate sophisticated understanding in order to 
assign reference in the way in which the joker would have prevented the 
hearer from making. Quite similarly, (22) plays with different referential 
candidates for “do this”. While the joker seems to guide the audience to 
take it to refer to the husband embracing and kissing the wife passionately, 
epistemic vigilance must discover that the joker did not actually intend 
that highly salient referent. Upon cautioning the comprehension module 
about its unlikelihood, sophisticated understanding must be enacted in 
order to access another covert referent: the husband taking his wife to the 
therapist for the therapist himself to embrace and kiss her passionately, not 
the husband. 
Senses of words or phrases are also manipulated by jokers to produce 
humorous effects (Yus Ramos 2008: 146-149), as in (23-25): 
 
(23) Question: Why did the bald man paint rabbits on his head? Answer: 
Because from a distance they looked like hares! 
(24) “Please remove your blouse and bra,” says the doctor to the young 
blonde, placing his stethoscope around his neck.  When she is ready, 
the doc says, “Big breaths.” “Yeth,” she replies, “and I’m only 
thixthteen!” 
(25) Question: What can a goose do, that a duck can’t do and a lawyer 
should do?  
Answer: Stick his bill up his ass. 
 
In (23) the humourist plays with the homophony between ‘hares’ and 
‘hairs’, in (24) with ‘breaths’ resembling ‘breasts’ when pronounced with 
lisping, and in (25) with ‘bill’ being polysemous (‘beak’ vs. ‘invoice’). 
The audience may be initially led to interpret these words as having a 
primary sense in those contexts, but epistemic vigilance must alert the 
comprehension module to the incorrectness of their disambiguation of 
sense so that it considers alternative senses on the assumption that there 
will be a humorous reward. Consequently, the comprehension module will 
engage in sophisticated understanding in order to track the intended sense 
that the joker might have envisaged in order to produce humour. 
Other jokes depend on the conceptual adjustment –narrowing or 
broadening– which the audience makes, as they contain metaphors (Yus 
Ramos 2008: 149-150): 
 
(26) A large, powerfully-built guy meets a woman at a bar. After a number 
of drinks, they agree to go back to his place. As they are making out 
in the bedroom, he stands up and starts to undress. After he takes his 
shirt off, he flexes his muscular arms and says, “See that, baby? 
That’s 1000 pounds of dynamite!” She begins to drool. The man 
drops his pants, strikes a bodybuilder’s pose, and says, referring to his 
bulging thighs, “See those, baby? That’s 1000 pounds of dynamite!” 
She is aching for action at this point. Finally, he drops his underpants, 
and after a quick glance, she grabs her purse and runs screaming to 
the front door. He catches her before she is able to leave and asks, 
“Why are you in such a hurry to go?” She replies, “With 2000 pounds 
of dynamite and such a short fuse, I was afraid you were about to 
blow!” 
(27) A little boy says: “Daddy, how was I born?” Dad says: “Ah, my son. I 
guess one day you will need to find out anyway! Well, you see, your 
Mom and I first got together in a chat room on MSN. Then I set up a 
date via e-mail with your mom and we met at a cyber-cafe. We 
sneaked into a secluded room, where your mother agreed to a 
download from my hard drive. As soon as I was ready to upload, we 
discovered that neither one of us had used a firewall, and since it was 
too late to hit the delete button, nine months later a blessed popup 
appeared and said: ‘You’ve Got Male!’” 
 
The role of epistemic vigilance when processing these jokes would be 
to check that the comprehension module adjusts the meaning of words like 
‘dynamite’, ‘fuse’ and ‘blow’ in (26), and ‘download’, ‘hard drive’, 
‘upload’, ‘firewall’, etc. in (27) as the joker would have envisaged. If it 
feels that this has not been correctly done, it would prompt the 
comprehension module to engage in sophisticated understanding in order 
to broaden them in such a way that the properties stereotypically 
associated with ‘dynamite’ and ‘fuse’ can also be extended to the 
powerfully-built guy’s anatomy or those of ‘download’, ‘hard drive’, 
‘upload’, ‘firewall’, etc. can be applied to the description of the undesired 
pregnancy. 
Finally, other jokes achieve humour because the audience is led to 
think that some of the characters in them would construct specific higher-
level explicatures for some utterances (Yus Ramos 2008: 150-151). For 
instance, in (28) the audience is guided to believe that the higher-level 
explicature that the guy would construct for “Take that sheep to the zoo” 
amounts to command or order: 
 
(28) A guy found a sheep and showed him to a policeman. The policeman 
said, “Take that sheep to the zoo, now.” Next day the policeman sees 
the man with the sheep again. The policeman stops the guy and says, 
“What on earth are you doing with that sheep?” The guy says, “What 
is there to do? Yesterday I took him to the zoo and now I’m taking 
him to the movies.” 
 
Epistemic vigilance must discover that the higher-level explicature that 
the character is thought to construct is not the one that the character 
actually constructs. Hence, it must instruct the comprehension module to 
consider an alternative hypothesis about the higher-level explicature, 
which, for this joke to be funny, would be one of advice or suggestion. 
Regarding the implicit level of communication, many jokes achieve 
humorous effects as a consequence of a clash between explicit information 
contained in the joke and the beliefs that the audience is led to retrieve or 
construct (Curcó 1995, 1996), the initial use of inappropriate or incorrect 
implicated premises that must be subsequently invalidated (Yus Ramos 
2003, 2008) or the activation of cultural or make-sense frames that must 
be later on discarded (Yus Ramos, forthcoming a). The explicit content of 
some jokes makes some target assumptions –as Curcó (1995, 1996) terms 
them– strongly manifest, but these turn out inappropriate or incorrect to 
grasp the humour. Epistemic vigilance would detect this and trigger 
sophisticated understanding, as a result of which the comprehension 
module would search for (an)other key assumption(s) which the joker 
intended not to make easily or straightforwardly accessible at the 
beginning of the joke. This happens in the following jokes: 
 
(29) Mom and Dad were trying to console Susie, whose dog had recently 
died. “You know,” Mom said, “it’s not your fault that the dog died. 
He’s probably up in heaven right now, having a grand old time with 
God.” Susie, still crying, said, “What would God want with a dead 
dog?” 
(30) Two blondes are waiting at a bus stop. When a bus pulls up and opens 
the door, one of the blondes leans inside and asks the bus driver: “Will 
this bus take me to 5th Avenue?” The bus driver shakes his head and 
says, “No, I’m sorry.” At this the other blonde leans inside, smiles, and 
twitters: “Will it take ME?” 
 
(29) makes strongly manifest the target assumption that dead dogs 
might have a grand time in heaven. Epistemic vigilance must discard it in 
favour of the key assumption that dead dogs cannot have a grand time 
there precisely because they are dead. In turn, in (30) the audience is 
initially led to entertain and believe an assumption such as that the bus is 
not going to 5th Avenue. However, epistemic vigilance must discover its 
incorrectness so that the comprehension module accesses another 
contextual assumption, such as that the second blonde believes the bus 
driver not to be willing to take her friend but might want to take her there. 
In addition to the assumptions that the joke makes manifest, many 
jokes require for the audience to look for implicated premises that yield 
implicated conclusions in which humour resides (Yus Ramos 2008: 152-
153). The role of epistemic vigilance in these jokes would precisely be to 
alert the comprehension module of the unsuitability of the explicit 
interpretation reachable for achieving humorous effects and to trigger 
sophisticated understanding so that the comprehension module expands 
the initial context by incorporating the necessary implicated premises to 
understand the joke and its humour. Accordingly, enacting sophisticated 
understanding when processing (31) and (33) would make it possible for 
the audience to access the implicated premises in (32 a, b) and (34 a, b, c), 
which would yield the implicated conclusions (32 c) and (34 d), 
respectively: 
 
(31) Little Nancy was in the garden filling in a hole when her neighbour 
peered over the fence. Interested in what the little girl was up to, he 
politely asked, “What are you up to there, Nancy?” “My goldfish 
died,” replied Nancy tearfully, without looking up, “and I’ve just 
buried him.” The neighbour was concerned, “That’s an awfully big 
hole for a goldfish, isn’t it?” Nancy patted down the last heap of earth 
and then replied, “That’s because he’s inside your stupid cat.” 
(32) a. The girl has killed the cat. 
b. A girl who can kill a cat is cruel and remorseless. 
c. Little Nancy is cruel and remorseless. 
(33) There were four country churches in a small Texas town: The 
Presbyterian Church, the Baptist Church, the Methodist Church and the 
Catholic Church. Each church was overrun with pesky squirrels. One 
day, the Presbyterian Church called a meeting to decide what to do 
about the squirrels. After much prayer and consideration they 
determined that the squirrels were predestined to be there and they 
shouldn`t interfere with God’s divine will. In the Baptist Church the 
squirrels had taken up habitation in the baptistery. The deacons met 
and decided to put a cover on the baptistery and drown the squirrels in 
it. The squirrels escaped somehow and there were twice as many there 
the next week. The Methodist Church got together and decided that 
they were not in a position to harm any of God’s creation. So, they 
humanely trapped the Squirrels and set them free a few miles outside 
of town. Three days later, the squirrels were back. But… The Catholic 
Church came up with the best and most effective solution. They 
baptized the squirrels and registered them as members of the church. 
Now they only see them on Christmas and Easter. 
(34) a. Catholics are not (supposed to be) very committed believers. 
b. Stereotypical uncommitted Catholics very rarely go to church. 
c. Stereotypical uncommitted Catholics (are said to) only go to church 
on special occasions. 
d. The squirrels behaved as stereotypical Catholics. 
 
Finally, in many jokes humourists play with the initial activation of 
cultural and make-sense frames (Yus Ramos, forthcoming a), which 
subsequently prove to be inappropriate, so that the comprehension module 
has to abandon them in favour of other more specific frames7. Consider 
(35) and (36): 
 
(35) An old lady sits on her front porch, rocking away the last days of her 
long life, when all of a sudden, a fairy godmother appears and informs 
her that she will be granted three wishes. “Well, now,” says the old 
lady, “I guess I would like to be really rich.” *** POOF *** Her 
rocking chair turns to solid gold. “And, gee, I guess I wouldn’t mind 
being a young, beautiful princess.” *** POOF *** She turns into a 
beautiful young woman. “Your third wish?” asks the fairy godmother. 
Just then the old woman’s cat wanders across the porch in front of 
them. “Ooh, can you change him into a handsome prince?” she asks. 
*** POOF *** There before her stands a young man more handsome 
than anyone could possibly imagine. She stares at him, smitten. With a 
smile that makes her knees weak, he saunters across the porch and 
whispers in her ear, “Bet you’re sorry you had me neutered.” 
(36) John and Bob were inseparable childhood friends. One night, they both 
died in a terrible car accident. When John woke up in heaven, he began 
to search for Bob but could not find him anywhere. Very distraught, he 
ran to St. Peter and said, “St. Peter, I know Bob was killed in that 
accident with me, but I can’t find him!” St. Peter said, “My son, I am 
sorry to tell you Bob didn’t make it to Heaven.” This upset John so 
much that St. Peter agreed to let him see Bob one more time. St. Peter 
parted the clouds and John saw Bob sitting in hell with a keg on one 
side and a beautiful buxom blonde on the other. John looked at St. 
Peter sceptically and said, “Are you sure I’m in the right place?” “My 
son,” St. Peter said, “looks can be deceiving. You see that keg of beer? 
It has a hole in it. You see that woman? She doesn’t!” 
 
In (35) the audience is guided to initially activate a cultural frame related 
to nice old ladies calmly and quietly living their last days at home and 
fairy godmothers granting wishes. They also have to activate the make-
sense frame of the old lady wanting a handsome prince in order to have 
sex. Epistemic vigilance would check that the latter frame, even if 
potentially valid, must be rejected at the end of the joke because the cat 
changed into a prince had been neutered. Therefore, epistemic vigilance 
would have to instruct the comprehension module to activate a quite 
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 Yus Ramos (forthcoming a) classifies of jokes depending on whether they target 
at utterance interpretation processes –logical forms, disambiguation, etc.– or the 
activation of cultural or make-sense frames in what he labels the Intersecting 
Circles Model. Humorous effects are argued to arise as a consequence of 
manipulating one or a combination of them. Due to space limitations, this 
discussion will only deal with two examples. 
different frame, for instance, one about old ladies eager for sexual 
intercourse with handsome guys and disappointment at being unable to 
have it. On the other hand, in (36) the audience is induced to activate a 
religious cultural frame in which good guys go to heaven and bad guys to 
hell. Such frame can be questioned when another make-sense frame 
related to kegs of beer and beautiful women is activated. This contradicts 
what souls are supposed to enjoy in heaven and hell. The contradiction 
between both frames is solved at the end of the joke, where the pun on 
‘holes’ appears. As a consequence, epistemic vigilance must discover that 
the comprehension module was fooled into activating that initial make-
sense frame and must hence discard it. Hence, epistemic vigilance must 
prompt the comprehension module to activate an alternative frame about 
tricky kegs of beer and deceptive appearances. 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Understanding utterances is a relevance-driven activity in which the 
language and comprehension module rely on the linguistic evidence 
provided and contextual information in order to perform a series of tasks 
whose result is an interpretation. For the hearer to finally believe that 
interpretation, he must be certain that it was the interpretation that the 
speaker actually intended, that the speaker is a trustworthy, reliable and 
skilled communicator and that he did not make any interpretive mistake. 
Epistemic vigilance can be seen as a surveillance mechanism playing an 
essential role in giving credit to our interlocutors, the information that they 
dispense, how they communicate it, how we process it and which other 
information we make use when processing it. As such, it would not enter 
the scene after the final product of comprehension –the interpretation– is 
reached; rather, it would be operative at every task which the 
comprehension module performs. Therefore, epistemic vigilance should 
not be conceived of as a module performing a final test on interpretations, 
but as an independent module working as comprehension proceeds.  
In spite of its independence, its working affects the working of the 
comprehension module. If epistemic vigilance finds out that speakers 
make unfortunate linguistic choices which prevent hearers from reaching 
the intended interpretation, that the language or comprehension modules 
make mistakes or that speakers seek to mislead or deceive hearers, it 
instructs the comprehension module to enact cautious optimism or 
sophisticated understanding. The former enables hearers to overcome 
expressive and interpretive mistakes by means of a first-order 
metarepresentation of speakers’ informative intention (Wilson 1999) or by 
searching for more suitable explicatures and implicatures. As a result, 
hearers can conclude that speakers were mistaken when saying what they 
said in the way they did or that they misunderstood their interlocutors. 
Thus, cautious optimism enables hearers to discard accidentally relevant 
or irrelevant unintended interpretations. As a consequence of the latter, 
hearers can overcome deception or grasp humorous effects thanks to 
second-, third- or fourth-order metarepresentations (Curcó 1995, 1996; 
Wilson 1999), from which they can conclude that speakers are lying, 
trying to convince them of something contradictory or are humorous. 
Thus, sophisticated understanding makes it possible for hearers to discard 
interpretations which speakers attempt to present as optimally relevant and 
believable, but are not actually the real, believable interpretations or those 
necessary to achieve effects like humour. 
Sperber (1994) and Wilson (1999) described these two processing 
strategies, but they did not explain why the comprehension module opts 
for one or the other. This paper has suggested that the enactment of either 
strategy follows as a consequence of epistemic vigilance and the search for 
optimal relevance. It has illustrated this by means of specific cases of 
misunderstandings and jokes. The same argument could be extended to 
other relatively similar phenomena, for example, to puns (e.g. Tanaka 
1992), with which the communicator misguides the audience to highly 
salient, maybe equally accessible, interpretations, but intends the audience 
to reach one interpretation, and also to those interpretations that radically 
differ from the explicit content, as in some innovative ironies (Yus Ramos, 
personal communication). In these, the explicit interpretation clashes with 
contextual information. Upon noticing that the speaker might have 
intended an interpretation of these utterances despite such clash, epistemic 
vigilance would prompt the comprehension module to search for a more 
implicit (i.e. ironic) interpretation (Yus Ramos 2012, forthcoming b). A 
more detailed analysis of these phenomena should be the subject for future 
work. 
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